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Abstract 
Numerous tudies have attempted to model the possible factors contributing to universal growth 
in public sectors. This paper analyzes one device that appears capable of controlling some of that 
growth: fiscal decentralization. The results reported here also support he use of monopoly govern- 
ment assumptions in models of public policy 
1. Introduction 
Scholars attempting to isolate the underlying causes of public sector growth 
have modeled Wagner's law, budget-maximizing bureaucrats, behavior of spe- 
cial interest groups, the effect of rising tax revenues on government expendi- 
tures and many other factors. 1Studies have also examined the empirical rela- 
tion between macroeconomic growth and public sector size and growth. 2 A 
recent avenue of research is concerned with devising effective constraints on 
government size and growth. This paper studies the Brennan and Buchanan 
(1977, 1980) hypothesis that fiscal decentralization is one behavioral constraint 
that determines public sector size. Empirical verification of the hypothesis 
would lend support for the Leviathan view of government that models public 
sector behavior as driven by self-interest ubject o constraints. Moreover, evi- 
dence supporting the decentralization hypothesis would suggest that efforts ini- 
tiated by the Reagan Administration to further decentralization will, over time, 
contribute to smaller total government in the United States. 
2. Constructing limits on Leviathan 
The public choice literature owes much to Downs (1957) and Buchanan and 
Tullock (1962) for questioning the public interest theory of government and for 
carrying over the reality of self-interest inthe private sector to the study of pub- 
*The author gratefully acknowledges the comments of Angelo R. Mascaro, Gordon Tullock and 
an anonymous referee. Views expressed here are of the author alone and do not necessarily 
represent those of the U.S. Department of Treasury. 
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lic sectors. Economic behavior is assumed to be determined, in part, by be- 
havioral constraints. Similar to the notion of a budget set constraining the be- 
havior of private utility-maximizing consumers, political and economic on- 
straints determine, in part, public servant behavior. An important implication 
is that when constraints do not undergo significant change over time, public 
sector behavior can be expected to be relatively invariant as well. Conversely, 
fundamental changes in constraints facing public servants are necessary ingre- 
dients for fundamental changes in behavior. Some condense this notion into 
the rubric: 'Institutions Matter.' Two examples are now discussed. 
Milton Friedman (1986) recently concluded that much of his time was 'ill 
spent' in attempting to persuade the Federal Reserve System to adopt more 
monetarist proposals. He states that his assumption that government servants 
maximize the public interest was the underlying flaw. Rather, the behavior of 
Federal Reserve officials should be assumed to respond to self-interest. Fried- 
man concludes: 'I'm not criticizing anybody except those who were responsible 
for setting up institutions that are not consistent with such a framework.' 
(p. 3). Optimal policy strategy in an environment of public officials pursuing 
self-interest would be determined'.., by analyzing the changes in institutional 
arrangements that would bring about he deslred results and trying to persuade 
the public to introduce those institutional changes rather than trying to in- 
fluence policy makers directly' (p. 5). 
Buchanan and Wagner (1977) provides another example. Taxpayer sensitivi- 
ty to larger government is argued to be lower the more indirect he tax used to 
finance government spending. The argument isthat the more direct he tax, the 
greater its 'pain'. The policy implication is that when governments have the 
ability to finance spending via debt finance and inflation, there will be relative- 
ly larger government sectors than in economies where governments are 
financed 'more directly.' In other words, the methods available to finance pub- 
lic sector spending determine, in part, the relevant definition of 'institutions'. 
Buchanan and Wagner argue that adding a balanced budget amendment to the 
constitution would alter the public sector's propensity for deficit finance and 
spending rowth. 
3. Fiscal decentralization hypothesiss 
The decentralization hypothesis i that 'Total government intrusion into the 
economy should be smaller, ceteris paribus, the greater the extent o which tax- 
es and expenditures are decentralized' (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980: 15). The 
means by which a move toward fiscal centralization may affect government 
size may be seen through its effect on the government's budget, or opportunity, 
set. Manage and Marlow (1986) argue that public spending is constrained by 
 ctors. nomic havior  ssumed  be det rmined,  rt,  ­
vioral nstraints. ilar  e tion  dget t nstraini g e ­
vior ivate tility-maximizing nsumers, litical d conomic n­
traints termine, rt, blic rvant havior. ortant lication 
 at en nstraints  t dergo i nificant ange er i e, blic 
ctor havior n  xpected  e latively ariant s l . versely, 
damental anges  nstraints cing blic rvants re cessary re­
i nts r damental anges  havior. e ndense is tion to 
e bric: stitutions ter.'  amples re w iscus ed. 
 dman 986) cently ncluded at ch is i e s 
ent'  ttempting to persuade e eral serve stem  opt re 
netarist oposals.  tates at i  ssumption at vernment rvants 
aximize e blic terest s e derlying . ther, e havior 
eral serve ficials ould  ssumed to spond  lf-interest. d­
n ncludes:  t iticizing nybody cept ose o re sponsible 
r t ing  titutions at re t nsistent h ch  ework.' 
. ). ti al licy trategy   vironment blic ficials pursuing 
lf-interest uld  termined' ...  alyzing e anges  titutional 
rrangements at uld ing out e sired sults d ying  rsuade 
e blic  troduce those titutional anges ther an ying  ­
ence licy makers irectly' . ). 
hanan d ner 977) ovides other ample. payer nsit vi­
 to rger vernment  rgued   er e re irect e tax used to 
ance vernment ending.  rgument  at the re irect t e x, e 
eater  ain'.  licy lication  at en vernments ve e 
ility  ance ending  bt ance d l tion, ere l  lative­
 rger vernment ctors an  conomies ere governments re 
anced ore i ectly.' her rds, the thods ailable  ance b­
 ctor ending termine, rt, the levant finition stitutions'. 
hanan d ner rgue at ing  lanced dget amendment  e 
nstitution uld lter e blic ctor's opensity r ficit finance and 
ending rowth. 
. al centralization othesi s 
 centralization pothesi   at tal vernment trusion to e 
conomy ould be aller, teris paribus, e greater e tent  ich x­
s d penditures re decentralized' nnan d hanan, 80: 15).  
eans  ich  ove toward cal ntralization ay ffect vernment 
i e ay  een rough s ffect  e vernment's dget,  portunity, 
t. age and low 986) rgue at public ending nstrained  
the government's otal budget constraint. The sum of direct legislated taxation, 
inflation-related taxes and net debt issue constitutes the forms of public finance 
and determines the opportunity set facing the public sector. Changes in fiscal 
decentralization can only affect the total ability of government to spend 
through effects on the three forms of public finance. 
If greater decentralization n government increases competition i the public 
sector, then greater decentralization may lead to relatively lower tax burdens. 
That is, the greater the numbers of alternative fiscal jurisdictions, the greater 
the potential competition of the public sector. The lower the degree of monop- 
oly, the less likely that 'excessive' tax payments are extracted from taxpayers 
which foster 'large' public sectors. Furthermore, greater government centrali- 
zation restricts the abilities of states to compete for residents through efficient 
political environments since a growing Federal share of total government may 
weaken their importance in overall governmental activity. 3 
In terms of inflationary finance, greater fiscal centralization may generate 
greater reliance on inflationary finance since the ability to print money is grant- 
ed only to the Central government. Centralization a d deficit finance may also 
be related since many argue that state governments operate under relatively 
more binding funding constraints hat does the Federal government. 4 In terms 
of both inflationary and deficit finance, these expectations may suggest that 
rising centralization generates rising spending opportunities. 
The above suggests that trends toward fiscal centralization expand the op- 
portunity sets of governments. While some of the changes in the usage of the 
three methods of public finance may represent changing allocations among the 
three due to changes in relative funding costs, the fiscal decentralization 
hypothesis argues that, other things being equal, centralization and gross 
spending opportunities are positively related. Conversely, ceteris paribus 
movements oward greater decentralization are hypothesized to yield smaller 
aggregate spending opportunities. 
Three potential problems with the decentralization hypothesis are addressed. 
One, a commonly accepted view asserts that public desire for a large defense 
establishment must cause a more concentrated government. This observation 
follows from the argument that national defense isnot efficiently provided by 
state and local governments and the desire to enlarge government via the 
defense stablishment has caused increased centralization and not the other 
way around. While, if correct, this argument may suggest acausality problem 
with the decentralization hypothesis, the evidence doesn't support its premise. 
Chart 1 clearly demonstrates that national defense outlays can not be blamed 
for rising centralization. 5 As either a percentage of GNP or total budget out- 
lays, national defense outlays have exhibited falling trends over our time period 
and therefore do not appear to be a contributory force in driving the centraliza- 
tion trend. 
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Chart I. National defense outlays 
Second, some might argue that rising social expenditures must drive an in- 
verse relation between public sector size and decentralization. Clearly Federal 
outlays on such items as health, income security, social security, and VA 
benefits constitute growing portions of total outlays and GNP. However, be- 
cause these services do not necessarily require Federal funding, growing de- 
mand for these services need not dictate an inverse relation between public sec- 
tor size and decentralization. 6 
Three, some might argue that the products of the different levels of govern- 
ment are fairly heterogeneous. That is, state and local governments produce 
apples while the Federal government produces oranges. If true, then the poten- 
tial for intergovernmental competition becomes a weaker argument insupport 
of the decentralization hypothesis. Further esearch on the substitutability of 
government products may show to what extent this i sue is important and how 
it will suggest future testing of the hypothesis. 
4. Previous research on the decentralization hypothesis 
Chart 2 displays the level of U.S. fiscal decentralization over 1939-85. Decen- 
tralization, or the ratio of state and local government expenditures-to-total 
government expenditures, changed from growing decentralization ver the 
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1950s and 1960s to growing centralization since the 1970s. Friedman and Fried- 
man (1984: 16) shows that Federal nondefense spending was nearly constant 
for close to 150 years prior to the period around 1930. By 1930, state and local 
expenditures were approximately over three times the size of Federal expendi- 
tures and the conomy could be classified as one with a truly decentralized 
government system. However, after the Great Depression, both Federal and 
state and local spending rose; however, the Federal share rose at a more rapid 
pace. 
The 1950s and 1960s were periods of rising decentralization; state and local 
government expenditure shares of total government expenditures rose from ap- 
proximately 25% to 43% .7 Buchanan and Wagner (1977: 57), argues that state 
and local government expenditures may be stimulated when Federal grants are 
offered on a matching basis. This may explain, in part, the behavior of decen- 
tralization over this period. Since the Reagan Administration has attempted to 
deemphasize the use of grants-in-aid tostate and local governments, he trend 
toward Federal government promotion of state and local government growth 
may have been reversed. 
Two recent papers tudy the empirical relation between decentralization a d 
government size. Oates (1985) tests state-local government behavior in the 
United States and of 43 countries and fails to support he decentralization 
hypothesis. In Nelson (1986), no evidence is determined in support of the 
hypothesis for the United States. In fact, Nelson provides ome evidence that 
more decentralized states levy relatively higher taxes, ceterisparibus, than less 
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decentralized states. Two reasons uggest hat these results may be suspect. 
One, the desirability of measuring decentralization at the stateqocal levels 
rather than the Federal-state and local levels is questionable. 8 Both studies de- 
fine decentralization as the ratio of local government activity over the sum of 
state and local government activity. That is, their measure of total government 
activity the sum of state and local government activity excludes the Feder- 
al government sector. However, it would appear that the most obvious measure 
of total government in the U.S. would be the sum of state, local and Federal 
government levels and such a measure is certainly consistent with the wording 
'total government i rusion' in Brennan and Buchanan (1980). By concen- 
trating on state and local units, Oates (1985) and Nelson (1986) test the decen- 
tralization hypothesis on a subset of total government activity; e.g., over one- 
half of recent U.S. government expenditure activity is not reflected. The 1984 
ratio of state and local government expenditures to total (state, local and Fed- 
eral) government expenditures is 37 °7o. These studies do not necessarily provide 
interesting implications for the usefulness of the decentralization hypothesis at 
the aggregate l vels of government. Tests which omit Federal government ac- 
tivity provide, at best, weak tests of the decentralization total government 
size hypothesis. 
Two, Oates (1985) and Nelson (1986) measure the relative size of government 
in terms of tax receipts. The problem here stems from the fact that government 
spending is financed from several sources. Tax receipts are either legislated 
(direct) or raised through inflation (indirect); debt must finance residual expen- 
ditures not covered by tax receipts. In this sense, current expenditures are al- 
ways balanced by total finances. Since the Federal government has operated 
persistent deficits since 1970, tax revenue measures of Federal government ac- 
tivity produce underestimates of public sector size. For example, Federal 
revenues and expenditures in 1984 as shares of GNP were. 19 and .24, respec- 
tively. Consequently, government expenditure measures provide more mean- 
ingful measures of public sector size by concentrating on a more complete 
measure of total resource absorption by governments. 
5. Empirical tests of the decentralization hypothesis 
A data series on total, Federal and state-local levels of U.S. government is con- 
structed over 1946-85. Choice of this time period is dictated by the desire to 
omit high transitory levels of WW II related Federal spending. Data on ex- 
penditures control for Federal grants-in-aid to state and local governments by 
counting that item under Federal expenditures only. All data used in the regres- 
sions below are obtained from Council of Economic Advisers (1986). 
As discussed above, decentralization f the public sector is probably best 
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 iscus ed ove, centralization  e blic ctor  obably st 
considered in terms of expenditures and measured by ratios of Federal-to- 
nonfederal government sectors. Accordingly, decentralization DEC t is the ra- 
tio of state and local expenditures-to-total government expenditures. Total 
government expenditures are the sum of state, local and Federal government 
expenditures. The absolute size of the total government sector L t is measured 
as the ratio of Federal and nonfederal expenditures-to-GNP and, as an alterna- 
tive measure, Lt* measures annual growth in Leviathan. 9 
The following equations are estimated. 
L t a 0 + aiD t + a2X t + e t (1) 
L*t ao + alDt* + a2Xt* + ut (2) 
where L t 
L*  t 
D t 
D*t 
X t 
X t  
e t, u t 
total government expenditure as a share of GNP in time t 
annual growth in total government expenditure as a share of 
GNP in time t 
share of state and local expenditure in total government expen- 
diture in time t. 
annual growth in D t 
control variables in time t 
annual growth in Xt, and 
random disturbance terms. 
Equation (1) is estimated by ordinary least quares and, as in Oates (1985), 
takes the logistic transformation LT t log (Lt/(1 -L t )  ) to allow the depen- 
dent variable to range over the whole set of real numbers. 
The decentralization hypothesis uggests inverse relations between decen- 
tralization DEC t and public sector size L t and public sector growth L* t. Two 
control variables are considered: real per capita disposable income PCY t (1982 
dollars) and population POP (in thousands). 1° PCY t controls for the in- 
fluence of Wagner's Law that argues that rising income is positively related to 
government growth. The control for population POP acts as a scale variable. 
Table 1 displays estimates of equation (1) both with and without control vari- 
ables. Equation (1.1) estimates the simple relation between decentralization 
and total government size and finds a significant and positive relation. Equa- 
tion (1.2), which includes control variables, finds a statistically significant and 
inverse relation between decentralization a d public sector size. 
Since both (1.1) and (1.2) are subject o serial correlation, equations (1.3) 
and (1.4) adjust for first-order serial correlation using the Cochrane-Orcutt 
technique. Support of the decentralization hypothesis provided in both equa- 
tions. Real per capita income PCY exerts a negative ffect that is statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level of confidence a result suggesting that pub- 
lic sector size is an income-inferior good. Population POP is found to exert an 
effect both statistically significant and positive on public sector size. 
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Table 1. Regression results: Government size decentralization relation* 
Dependent variable: Total government expenditures/GNP 
Equ. Intercept DEC t PCY  t POP t Rho D W ~2 
(1.1) .100 .506 
(2.39) (4.70) .54 .35 
(1.2) .015 .178 7.4E-06 .002 
(.51) (2,78) (1.31) (5.48) .88 .90 
(1.3) .552 .528 
(14.3) (7.04) .93 1.96 .94 
(1.4) .100 - .514  .0002 .003 
(.70) (7.08) (2.43) (3.16) .89 1.69 .95 
Dependent variable: First differences in total government expenditures/GNP 
Equ. Intercept DEC t PCY t POP D W ~2 
(1.5) .005 1.007 
(1.42) (9.49) 1.83 .69 
(1.6) .004 .970 4.7E-06 .020 
(2.06) (9.07) (.23) (2.43) 1.63 .73 
*t-statistics in parentheses. 
DEC t non-Federal expenditures/total government expenditures. 
PCY t real $1972 per capita disposable income. 
POP t population in millions. 
Tests are also conducted using first-differences of all variables as an alterna- 
tive means o f adj usting for the existence of first-order serial correlation in (1.1) 
and (1.2). Results of this data transformation are shown in Equations (1.5) and 
(1.6) and, besides the coefficient on per capita income becoming statistically 
insignificant, the results do not change and the hypothesis of zero serial corre- 
lation is not rejected at the 5°70 level. Though not reported here, the inclusion 
of a time variable in (1.2) and (1.4) as an independent variable did not alter the 
results therefore providing further evidence that the observed relation be- 
tween government size and decentralization is not related to some time trend 
outside the investigation. 
Table 2 displays estimates of equation (2) using growth rate rather than level 
data. The transformation is X t 100 x (log (Xt)-log (Xt_ 1 )). The results of equa- 
tion (2), with and without control variables, do not differ substantially from 
those of equation (1). Equations (2.1) and (2.2) are subject o substantial serial 
correlation. Using the Cochane-Orcutt echnique to adjust for serial correla- 
tion, equations (2.3) and (2.4) provide substantial support for the hypothesis 
that decentralization growth inversely affects government growth. The equa- 
tions (2.5) and (2.6) provide estimates using first-differences of growth data to 
adjust for serial correlation and continue to provide support of the decentrali- 
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Table 2. Regression results: Government growth decentralization growth relation* 
Dependent variable: Annual growth rate of total gov't expenditures/GNP 
Equ. Intercept DECR t PCYR t POPR t Rho D W R2 
(2.1) 1.96 -.747 
(2.91) (17.61) 1.71 .89 
(2.2) -.619 -.795 -.764 3.03 
(.25) (19.45) (2.80) (1.81) 1.52 .91 
(2.3) 1.92 -.633 
(2.77) (6.72) .04 1.88 .57 
(2.4) .624 -.714 -.886 2.29 .22 1.93 .67 
(.21) (6.80) (3.43) (1.11) 
Dependent variable: First differences in annual growth rate of total gov't expenditure/GNP 
Equ. Intercept DECR t PCYR t POPR t D W ~2 
(2.5) .030 .815 
(.03) (3.37) 
(2.6) .111 .808 .952 1.03 
(.16) (17.13) (3.96) (.24) 
2.64 .86 
2.56 .90 
*t-statistics in parentheses. 
DECR t annual growth rate of non-Federal expenditures/total government expenditures. 
PCYR t annual growth rate of real $1972 per capita disposable income. 
POPR t annual growth rate of population i  millions. 
zat ion hypothesis,  as well as further evidence that the est imated relat ion is not 
related to a t ime-trend outside the investigation. 
6. Concluding remarks 
There is no question that the publ ic sectors o f  industr ial ized economies have 
displayed a propensi ty for growth over this century. Despite this historical pat- 
tern, the results o f  this paper  should be encouraging for those concerned with 
growing publ ic sectors. Fiscal decentral izat ion appears to be a viable means of  
lowering, or control l ing, the extent of  total  governmental  ctivity. This empiri-  
cal result lends support  for the use o f  monopo ly  government assumptions in 
models o f  publ ic pol icy and suggests that shift ing o f  government responsibi l i -  
ties f rom the Federal  to the state and local government sectors is a pol icy act ion 
that will contr ibute toward a slowing, or fall ing, of  publ ic sector size and 
growth in the United States. 
This paper  should be considered to be an initial at tempt at model ing the 
decentra l izat ion-government size relat ion over time. Further  research should 
be directed toward issues that may compl icate the model ing of  the relation. For  
example,  i f  certain government programs imply or require a Federal  role, then 
le 2. gression result : Governm nt rowth - ecentralization rowth lation* 
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. l ding remarks 
re   estion t e blic ctors ustrialized economies ve 
isplayed  pensity  owth r is ntury. Despite is torical t­
rn, e sults is per ould  couraging  ose cerned  
owing public ctors. al centralization pears   ble ans 
ring, trolling, e tent tal vernmental tivity. This piri­
l sult ds pport  the e nopoly vernment ssumptions 
dels blic licy d ggests t ifting vernment sponsibili­
i s  e eral  e tate d al vernment ctors  licy tion 
t l tribute ard l ing, lling, blic ctor ize d 
o th e ed tes. 
 per ould  sidered  be  itial ttempt t deling e 
centralization-governme t ize lation r i e. ther search ould 
 irected ard sues t y plicate e deling e lation. 
ample, rtain government ograms ly  quire eral le, en 
growth  o f  these government  programs may cause growing f iscal centra l izat ion.  
Some argue that  mi l i tary  spending is a p rogram in this category.  Whi le  this may 
be true, we have shown evidence that  mi l i tary spending can not  be b lamed for  
increased centra l i zat ion over  our  t ime per iod.  However ,  further  research in this 
area may prov ide  us with programs that  may fit into this category and can be 
b lamed for  increased centra l izat ion.  Research on the subst i tutabi l i ty  between 
d i f ferent  levels o f  government  may lso suggest products  where little potent ia l  
exists for  compet i t ion  between governments .  Future  research may at tempt  o 
e l iminate those areas f rom the empir ica l  test ing o f  the hypothesis .  Another  
avenue for  research wou ld  be to examine  how publ ic  pol ic ies may be designed 
to foster changes in f iscal centra l izat ion.  
Notes 
1. See, for example, Gupta (1967), Niskanen (1971), Olsen (1965), Meltzer and Richards (1983), 
Manage and Marlow (1986) and Marlow and Orzechowski (1987). 
2. See, for example, Landau (1983), Weede (1984), Ram (1986) and Marlow (1986). 
3. See Council of Economic Advisers (1982) for this argument. 
4. See Marlow and Manage (1987) for a discussion of this issue. 
5. Data from Table 6.2 in Office of Management and Budget (1986). 
6. Furthermore, the growth of these services represents he interplay of many forces: changes in 
demographics, income, special interest powers and relative shifts in technology and costs. 
Without further investigation, the a priori net sum of these supply and demand sources for 
public services can not predetermine a bias toward federal (over state and local) government 
growth. 
7. Buchanan and Wagner (1977: 57) argues that much of the state and local finance data are mis- 
leading due to Federal grants to state and local governments. It is noted that my data adjusts 
for such duplication. 
8. It is noted that Nelson (1986) tests the decentralization hypothesis using a measure of govern- 
ment centralization state government share of state and local government taxes. 
9. Clearly, this measure of total public sector size represents an underestimate of the 'true' size 
of public sectors. However, the 'true' size is unobservable due to inability to consistently ag- 
gregate all of the many varied cases of public sector involvement in the economy. These cases 
include property right enforcement, regulations, tariffs, subsidies on social and economic ac- 
tivities, monetary policy, and taxation policies. One recent approach to the measurement is 
found in Shugart and Tollison (1986) where the size of government is examined by analyzing 
the legislative output of the U.S. Congress. 
10. Oates (1985) found a positive and statistically significant coefficient for PCY and a coefficient 
not statistically different from zero on POP. Lack of consistent data on urban population dic- 
tated its exclusion here; a control variable that was statistically significant from zero in one- 
third of Oates' estimated equations. 
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